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On June 22, 2006, the United States Supreme Court broadened
1
the purview of the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII when it held
that the provision prohibits employer actions that would be
considered materially adverse by a reasonable employee, regardless
of whether such actions occurred at the workplace or were related to
employment.2 In so holding, the Supreme Court did three things
worthy of comment. First, the Court expunged the confusion caused
by disparate and incompatible treatments of the anti-retaliation
provision by the circuit courts. Second, by subjecting all employer
action to review, the Court reassured employees that by pursuing or
assisting the pursuit of a discrimination claim the employees need not
endure, without recourse, dissuasive actions of their employer that are
marginally work-related. Third, by instituting a coherent materially
adverse standard, the Court assuaged a common fear of employers
that workplace conduct chronologically proximate to a claim of
discrimination is kindling for an anti-retaliation claim.
I. BACKGROUND
A dispute between Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway
Company, the petitioner, and Sheila White, the respondent, afforded
the Supreme Court the opportunity to articulate its most recent
interpretation of Title VII. That dispute commenced in the summer of
1997 when Burlington Northern hired White as a track laborer in its
Maintenance and Way department.3 As a track laborer, White’s job
duties included removing and replacing track components,
transporting track material, cutting brush, and clearing litter and
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1. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2000).
2. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2409 (2006). Justice Alito
concurred in the judgment but not the reasoning of the Court.
3. Id.
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4
cargo spillage. However, soon after being hired, White was told that
5
she would be operating a forklift instead.
In September of 1997, White complained to Burlington Northern
officials that her immediate supervisor, Bill Joiner, had not only
frequently commented to her that women should not be working in
the Maintenance and Way department, but that he also directed
insulting and inappropriate remarks to her in front of her male co6
workers. After an internal investigation, Joiner was suspended for ten
days and ordered to attend sexual-harassment training, and White was
told to discontinue her operation of the forklift and to resume the
standard track laborer job duties.7 White was informed that the
impetus for her reassignment was co-worker complaints that a “more
senior man” should have the “less arduous and cleaner job” of forklift
operator.8 The change in White’s job duties did not alter her pay or
benefits.9
In October of 1997, White filed a retaliation charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) claiming that her
reassignment constituted an unlawful retaliation for her September
10
complaint about Joiner. Despite filing the charge, White continued
working for Burlington Northern until December of 1997 when, after
a disagreement with her immediate supervisor, White was suspended
without pay for allegedly being insubordinate.11 Subsequent internal
grievance procedures concluded that White had not been
insubordinate, and she was consequently reinstated and awarded
backpay for the thirty-seven days she was suspended.12 White filed an
13
additional retaliation charge for her suspension.
After exhausting her administrative remedies under the EEOC,
White filed suit against Burlington Northern in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Tennessee claiming that
Burlington Northern, in changing her job responsibilities and
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suspending her for thirty-seven days, had unlawfully retaliated against
14
her in violation of Title VII. The jury returned a verdict in favor of
White on her retaliation claim.15 A divided Sixth Circuit panel
reversed the judgment.16
II. SIXTH CIRCUIT INTERPRETATION OF THE ANTIRETALIATION PROVISION
The Sixth Circuit reheard the case en banc and agreed with the
District Court that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find
that the thirty-seven-day unpaid suspension, as well as the transfer to
a more arduous and dirtier job, constituted unlawful retaliation.17
However, indicative of the disagreement between the other circuit
courts, the majority and minority construed the phrase “discriminate
against” in Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision differently.18
19
Title VII does not define “discriminate against,” thus obliging
courts to breathe life into the phrase before it can be applied to the
20
facts. Consequently, the various circuit courts have reached different
conclusions regarding both whether an employer action challenged
under the provision must be employment or workplace related, and
how harmful or injurious an employer action must be to constitute
retaliation.21
An eight-judge majority of the en banc Sixth Circuit held that in
order to “prevent lawsuits based upon trivial workplace
dissatisfactions,” a plaintiff must prove the existence of an adverse
employment action in an anti-retaliation claim.22 According to the
majority, an adverse employment action is a “materially adverse

14. In re Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 162 F. Supp. 2d 699 (W.D. Tenn. 2001).
15. Id.
16. Burlington N., 126 S. Ct. at 2410.
17. White, 364 F.3d at 803.
18. Id.
19. In relevant part, Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision provides only that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against
any of his employees . . . because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because [the employee] has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000) (emphasis
added).
20. See White, 364 F.3d at 795.
21. Burlington N., 126 S. Ct. at 2410.
22. White, 364 F.3d at 795.
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change in the terms and conditions of [the employee’s]
23
Contained within that definition of adverse
employment.”
employment action were two requisite directives for the resolution of
anti-retaliation claims in the Sixth Circuit.24 First, only changes in
“terms and conditions of employment” would be scrutinized by the
25
court. Second, to be actionable, those changes must be “materially
adverse” to the employee.26
The Sixth Circuit’s definition of adverse employment action was
narrower than some and broader than other definitions proffered by
the various circuit courts. For example, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits
held that only “ultimate employment decisions”—acts such as hiring,
granting leave, discharging, promoting, and compensating—would be
subject to review.27 On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit held that as
long as the employer’s action was “reasonably likely to deter”
employees from engaging in activity protected by the provision, that
action would be prohibited.28
Although a six-judge minority of the en banc Sixth Circuit agreed
with the majority’s rejection of the “untenable” ultimate employment
action doctrine of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits,29 it disagreed as to
what constituted a sufficiently adverse employment action to invoke
30
Title VII’s anti-retaliatory provision. The minority espoused utilizing
the “reasonably likely to deter” standard adopted by the Ninth
31
Circuit, contending that such a standard was more consistent with
the statutory language of Title VII and Supreme Court precedent.32
Thus, the holding of the en banc Sixth Circuit highlighted both the
disagreement between and within the circuit courts as to the correct
interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision. And as the holding
occupied the vanguard in a long series of disparate and incompatible
circuit court constructions of the anti-retaliation provision, the en

23. Hollins v. Atlantic Co., 188 F.3d 652, 662 (6th Cir. 1999).
24. See White, 364 F.3d at 795.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997); see Manning v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997).
28. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1242–43 (9th Cir. 2000).
29. White, 364 F.3d at 808.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 809.
32. Id.
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banc Sixth Circuit’s decision sufficiently captured the Supreme
Court’s attention to warrant a grant of certiorari.
III. SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATION OF THE ANTIRETALIATION PROVISION
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether Title
VII’s anti-retaliation provision “forbids only those employer actions
and resulting harms that are related to employment or the
workplace,” and to determine “how harmful an act of retaliatory
33
discrimination must be in order to fall within the provision’s scope.”
The Court ultimately held that the anti-retaliation provision forbids
those employer actions that would be considered materially adverse
by a reasonable employee or job applicant, regardless of whether such
actions occurred at the workplace or were related to employment.34
A. Inside and Outside the Workplace
The Court’s opinion, authored by Justice Breyer, expanded the
scope of the anti-retaliation provision beyond that of the antidiscrimination provision by first severing the link between the two
provisions,35 a link that was integral to the Sixth Circuit holding that in
order for an employer to violate Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision
it must effect a materially adverse change in the “terms and
conditions” of the employee’s employment.36 Contradicting the Sixth
Circuit’s approach, the Court instructed that the anti-retaliation
provision not be read in pari materia with the anti-discrimination
provision.37
In relevant part, Title VII’s anti-discrimination provision provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion or national
38
origin.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Burlington N., 126 S. Ct. at 2409.
Id.
Id.
White, 364 F.3d at 795.
Burlington N., 126 S. Ct. at 2410.
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
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The Court noted that the italicized words—hire, discharge, and
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment—do not
appear in the anti-retaliation provision, which is significant because
those words restrict the scope of the anti-discrimination provision to
only those actions that either “affect employment or alter the
39
conditions of the workplace.” In light of the Court’s established
presumption that “Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the
40
disparate inclusion or exclusion [it exhibits],” the Court observed
that there is reason to believe that Congress intended the differences
in scope that the language intimates.41 The Court attested that this
belief is strengthened by a clear difference in purpose between the
provisions: the anti-discrimination provision “seeks to prevent injury
to individuals based on who they are,” and the anti-retaliation
provision “seeks to prevent harms to individuals based on what they
do.”42 In other words, “purpose reinforces what language already
indicates.”43
The Court analyzed this difference in purpose and concluded that
although the objective of the anti-discrimination provision could be
achieved without prohibiting anything other than employmentrelated discrimination, the objective of the anti-retaliation provision
could not be.44
The Court recognized that employer retaliation against an
45
employee can be just as effective outside the workplace as inside it.
To illustrate this recognition, the opinion pointed to Rochon v.
Gonzales, wherein the FBI retaliated against an employee by refusing
to investigate death threats made against that employee and his wife
by a federal prisoner.46 The chilling effect such an action would have
on further complaints is clear. And as enforcement of Title VII
depends upon the willingness of employees to file complaints and act
as witnesses, the Court concluded that “[i]nterpreting the antiretaliation provision to provide broad protection . . . helps assure the
cooperation upon which accomplishment of the Act’s primary

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Burlington N., 126 S. Ct. at 2411–12.
Id. at 2412 (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
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47
objective depends.” Consequently, the anti-retaliation provision is
not tied to any specific type of employer act; instead, it encompasses
48
all employer acts.

B. Actionable Injury or Harm
Regardless of the scope of the anti-retaliation provision, which
subjects all employer conduct to scrutiny, only those employer actions
that produce an injury or harm are prohibited.49 The Court, in accord
with the Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits, asserted that for
the alleged harm or injury to be actionable a plaintiff must show a
reasonable employee would have found the employer’s conduct
50
materially adverse. For conduct to be considered materially adverse,
the plaintiff must show that it “well might have” dissuaded a
reasonable employee from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.51 The Court explained that it used the phrase
“materially adverse” because it wanted to clearly separate the
actionable significant harms from the non-actionable trivial harms.52
The Court argued that such a separation is important because the role
of the anti-retaliation provision is to deter employers from hampering
an employee’s “unfettered access” to Title VII’s remedies,53 and one
can assume that trivial harms—“petty slights, minor annoyances, and
simple lack of good manners”—will not hamper an employee’s access
to such remedies.54 To assume otherwise would allow employees to
inoculate themselves from those “petty slights or minor annoyances”
that are an inevitable part of every work environment and that all
employees endure.55
In its attempt to instruct future courts as to how to apply this
standard, the Court stressed that the materially adverse standard is
“tied to the challenged retaliatory act,”56 but not the underlying
57
conduct forming the basis of the Title VII complaint. The Court also
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 2414.
Id. at 2412.
Id. at 2414.
Id. at 2415.
Id. (quoting Rochon, 438 F.3d. at 1219).
Id.
Id. (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2416.
Id.
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explained that the materially adverse standard is phrased in general
terms because “the real social impact of workplace behavior often
depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances,
expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a
58
simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed.”
59
Put more concisely, context matters. To illustrate the Court’s point,
the opinion offered the following example: Altering an employee’s
work schedule may be insignificant to most workers, but such a
change may be quite significant to a young mother with school-age
children.60 Thus, the Court provides not only a clear standard, but also
direction and illustration to aid its application.
In applying its materially adverse standard to the facts at issue in
this case, the Court supplies a concise look at how this standard is to
be utilized. The Court ultimately concluded that there was sufficient
evidentiary basis to support the jury’s verdict on White’s retaliation
61
claim. With regard to Burlington Northern reassigning White the job
duties of a track laborer after it had assigned her the less arduous and
cleaner duties of forklift operator, the Court noted that a jury could
conclude that the reassignment to a more arduous and dirtier job with
less prestige would have been materially adverse to a reasonable
employee.62 With regard to the thirty-seven-day suspension, the Court
reasoned that “an indefinite suspension without pay could well act as
a deterrent, even if the suspended employee eventually received
backpay.”63 The Court explained that White’s receipt of backpay did
not cure the fact that both White and her family had to subsist for
thirty-seven days without income, “not knowing whether or when
White would return to work.”64 Consequently, the Court found that
the jury reasonably concluded that White’s payless suspension was
65
materially adverse.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 2415 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2416.
Id. at 2417.
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Id.
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C. Prohibited Action in the Wake of the Burlington Northern Case
Employees have been greatly benefited by the Court’s holding
because all employer action is now subject to review in all circuits,
regardless of whether such action occurs at the workplace or is
related to employment. And although it is unlikely that employers
will attempt to dissuade employees via actions that have absolutely no
relationship to the workplace or employment, it is less unlikely that
they will attempt to do so via actions that are marginally work related.
Thus, this holding specifically benefits employees by reassuring them
that in pursuing or assisting the pursuit of a discrimination claim an
employee need not endure, without recourse, the marginally workrelated but nevertheless dissuasive actions of his or her employer.
Remarkably, Justice Alito concluded that this benefit runs counter
to Title VII because it “implies that the persons whom Title VII is
principally designed to protect—victims of discrimination based on
race, color, sex, national origin, or religion—receive less protection
than victims of retaliation.”66 But this conclusion fails to note that the
anti-retaliation provision protects victims of discrimination, whether it
does so directly or indirectly. Thus, the fact that its scope is broader
than that of the anti-discrimination provision actually affords victims
of discrimination more protection, not less.67 For example, the antiretaliation provision prohibits an employer from retaliating against an
68
employee for opposing a practice made unlawful by Title VII, which
69
directly protects a victim of discrimination. The provision also
prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee who is
testifying, assisting, or participating in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under Title VII,70 which indirectly protects a victim of
discrimination because it is a victim’s investigation, proceeding, or
hearing that the employee, now protected from retaliation, is
undeterred from assisting or participating in.71
By expanding the scope of the anti-retaliation provision beyond
that of the anti-discrimination provision, the Court benefited
employees by providing broader Title VII protection than they would

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 2419 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).
Burlington N., 126 S. Ct. at 2419 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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have had if the reach of the provisions remained equal. Nevertheless,
this enlargement of the anti-retaliation provision’s scope is unlikely to
be perceived as a benefit by employers because it exacerbates a
common fear that any workplace conduct chronologically proximate
to a claim of discrimination is kindling for an anti-retaliation claim.
Now, any employer conduct that attends a claim of discrimination is
capable of stoking the fire of prosecution. Of course, due to the
Court’s institution of a materially adverse standard, such acts must
still meet a specific deterrence threshold: only employer acts that
“well might . . . dissuade[]” a reasonable employee from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination are actionable. Consequently,
the use of a materially adverse standard should diminish employer
apprehension that once an employee makes a charge of
discrimination he must be handled with a velvet glove.
Nonetheless, Justice Alito’s various disagreements with the
majority’s materially adverse standard portend what will likely be
other concerns of employers attempting to use this standard to guide
their conduct in a post-Burlington Northern employment context.
Justice Alito asserted that the majority’s standard is concerned with
retaliation that well might dissuade an employee from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination, and therefore the type of
discrimination, more specifically its severity, must be taken into
72
Because employees who have endured severe
account.
discrimination may not be easily dissuaded from complaining and vise
versa, “the majority’s interpretation logically implies that the degree
of protection afforded to a victim of retaliation is inversely
proportional to the severity of the original act of discrimination that
prompted the retaliation.”73
Fortunately, in addressing Justice Alito’s arguments one can not
only assuage these anticipated concerns, but also provide even more
guidance as to what employer actions are now prohibited under the
anti-retaliation provision. Justice Alito’s analysis ignores the clear
statements of the majority opinion to the contrary. As the majority
pointed out, “the standard is tied to the challenged retaliatory act, not
the underlying conduct that forms the basis of the Title VII
complaint.”74 More specifically, the majority expressly addressed
72. Id. at 2420.
73. Id. at 2420–21.
74. Id. at 2416 (majority opinion)
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Alito’s criticism when it asserted that “this standard does not require
the reviewing court or jury to consider ‘the nature of the
75
discrimination that led to the filing of the charge.’”
This assertion is corroborated by the majority’s choice of language
in communicating its materially adverse standard. The challenged
action must dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting
“a charge of discrimination.”76 Note that the majority did not use the
definite article “the” before the noun phrase “charge of
discrimination,” which would have clearly pointed at the specific
charge of discrimination alleged by the plaintiff. Instead, the majority
used the indefinite article “a.” An indefinite article “points to
nonspecific objects, things, or persons that are not distinguished from
the other members of a class.”77 Consequently, the definition of the
indefinite article “a,” at the very least, intimates that the majority
expects one to envision a generic charge of discrimination when
determining whether the plaintiff well might have been dissuaded by
the alleged retaliatory act. Thus, when applying the standard, an
employer must simply consider whether the retaliation might well
deter a reasonable employee from complaining about discrimination
in general, not the specific discrimination alleged by the employee.78
Justice Alito also questioned the majority’s conception of the
79
reasonable employee. One illustration provided by the majority
involved a change in the work schedule of a young mother with
80
school-age children. The majority contended that such an act may
not disturb many employees, but may greatly disturb such a mother.81
Justice Alito asserted that this illustration proves that the majority’s
test does not concern the reasonable employee, but rather “a
reasonable worker who shares at least some individual characteristics
82
with the actual victim.” Justice Alito further asserted that the
majority’s illustration introduced three individual characteristics (age,
gender, and family responsibilities), and he expressed concern that
“[h]ow many more individual characteristics a court or jury must

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 2415 (quoting Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. (emphasis added).
CHICAGO MANUAL OF STYLE 166 (15th ed. 2003).
See Burlington N., 126 S. Ct. at 2416.
Id. at 2421.
See id.
Id.
Id.

36

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

VOL. 2:25

83
consider is unclear.” But Justice Alito appears to incorrectly equate
context with individual characteristics.
The majority placed the reasonable person in the employee’s
context; it did not give the reasonable person the employee’s
84
characteristics. The difference between the two approaches is best
conveyed by the majority’s illustration of the young mother with
school-age children. In considering the “constellation of surrounding
circumstances, expectations, and relationships”85 revolving around a
young mother with school-age children, jurors, judges, and prudent
employers would be expected to place the reasonable person in a
situation where he is an employee burdened with the expectations
and circumstances that would typically accompany having to care for
children.86 For example, a reasonable person who is required to work
and, at the very least, is also expected to share in the responsibility of
feeding, picking up, and supervising children will likely be more
affected, and thus dissuaded, by a change in a work schedule than an
employee unhindered by such responsibilities.
Justice Alito’s final critique of the majority’s standard is that “well
87
might dissuade” is a “loose and unfamiliar causation standard,” and
“in an area of the law in which standards of causation are already
complex, the introduction of this new and unclear standard is
unwelcome.”88 The three-word combination “well might dissuade” is
arguably unfamiliar. Nevertheless, the majority provides enough
information and explanation to provide sufficient, if not clear,
guidance for the standard’s interpretation and application.
The language in the opinion, which was lifted verbatim from
Rochon, places “well” directly before the word “might,” indicating
that “well” modifies “might.”89 Although there are many definitions of
the word “well,” the majority’s application of its causation standard to
the facts shows that “well” is intended to augment “might” in a way
that conveys a greater degree of likelihood than “might” would
90
alone. More specifically, when applying its causation standard to the

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id. at 2415 (majority opinion).
Id.
See id.
Id. at 2421 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
Id.
Id. at 2415 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2417.
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facts, the majority determined that “an indefinite suspension without
91
pay could well act as a deterrent.” In substituting “could” for
“might,” the majority imparted that it considers “might well have” as
synonymous with “could well have.”92 The word “well” directly
93
preceded by “could” conveys that “well” means “easily” or “readily.”
Thus, by way of diction deduction, it becomes apparent that the
majority considers actionable conduct to be conduct that “easily” or
“readily” could dissuade a reasonable employee from filing or
supporting a charge of discrimination. This interpretation of the
majority’s standard equates with the majority’s imposition of a
materially adverse standard in order to preclude an employee from
inoculating himself or herself from those “petty slights or minor
annoyances” that are an inevitable part of every work environment
and that all employees endure.94 Certainly, “petty slights and minor
annoyances” would not “easily” or “readily” dissuade an employee
from filing or supporting a charge of discrimination.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court’s most recent interpretation of the anti-retaliation
provision is the bearing point for employers, employees, and courts
sailing upon the provision’s waters. It replaces the disparate and
incompatible direction previously proffered by the circuit courts. It
also expands the navigable waters to all employer acts, thus reassuring
employees that by pursuing or assisting the pursuit of a discrimination
claim an employee need not endure those dissuasive actions of his or
her employer that are marginally work-related. And by instituting a
coherent materially adverse standard, the Court has allowed
employers to remove the velvet glove, grasp the helm of their business
without timidity, and treat employees in that zone of proximity
following a discrimination claim as justly and fairly as they would any
other, and no better.

91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1421 (11th ed. 2003).
Burlington N., 126 S. Ct. at 2417.

